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HOLDER v. HALL: BLINKING AT MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS
Laughlin McDonald*
INTRODUcTION

In Chisom v. Roemer,' the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act2 (Section 2) "should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the
broadest possible scope' in combatting racial discrimination." 3 Three years later, in
Holder v. Hall,' a majority of the Court retreated from this expansive reading of
the Act and held for the first time that a voting practice found by a court of
appeals to dilute minority voting strength-the sole commissioner form of
government in Bleckley County, Georgia-could not be challenged under Section
2. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, urged the Court to go even farther. In
an extraordinary concurring opinion, which Justice Stevens described on no less
than three occasions as being "radical," 5 Justice Thomas argued that the scope of
Section 2 should be restricted to exclude all claims of minority vote dilution and to
reach "only state enactments that limit citizens' access to the ballot."'

The

adoption of such a view, wholly at odds with the Court's clearly established
precedent and the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act, would amount to

* Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU Foundation. Inc.. Atlanta. Georgia. B.A.. Columbia
University, 1960; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1965.
1. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). The statute provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
3. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1960)).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the claim by the State of Louisiana that the method of electing
appellate court judges from multimember districts was not subject to challenge under Section 2 because
judicial office holders were not representatives. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 398-99. In a companion case. Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991), the Court rejected a related claim that
the method of electing trial court judges was immune from challenge under Section 2 because they were single
member office holders.
4. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) [hereinafter Holder III].
5. Id. at 2628 ("[tlhe radical character of that suggested interpretation"); Id. at 2629 ("Justice
Thomas's radical reinterpretation of the Voting Rights Act"); Id. (-Justice Thomas attempts to minimize the
radical implications of his interpretation").
6. Id. at 2592. In joining the opinion of Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia necessarily repudiated his
previously stated view in Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405, that "§ 2 extends to vote dilution claims for the elections of
representatives."
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virtual repeal of Section 2, and would threaten to erase most of the gains in
minority office-holding over the past two decades.
Parts I and II of this Article discuss the sole commissioner form of government
in Bleckley County and the nature and disposition of plaintiffs' Section 2 challenge
in the lower courts. Part III analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court, its
formalistic construction of Section 2, and the Court's retreat from voting rights
enforcement. Part IV is a critique of the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas and
responds to his arguments that the creation of majority-minority districts
improperly embroils the courts in political theorizing and is a form of segregation.
This Article concludes with a discussion of the critical role of vote dilution
jurisprudence and the importance of the creation of majority-minority districts in
ensuring effective minority political participation.
I.

GEORGIA'S UNIQUE SOLE COMMISSIONER FORM OF GOVERNMENT

The sole commissioner form of government challenged in Holder v. Hall is
unique to the State of Georgia. Each county in the state has a "governing
authority,' 7 consisting of "the board of county commissioners, the sole county
commissioner, or the governing authority of a consolidated government.",, The
governing authority exercises all the legislative and executive powers of county
government.9 No counties outside Georgia use a sole commissioner; all the other
states use multimember county governing bodies. 10
Even in Georgia the sole commissioner is exceptional. The multimember board
of commissioners form of county government is overwhelmingly predominant, with
a five member board being the most common size." The number of sole
commissioner counties has declined in recent years, until there are only about ten

7. GA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1, P. 1.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-3(7) (1981).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-5-22.1 (1981); Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2584. Those powers include directing
and controlling all the property of the county, levying general and special taxes for the county, constructing
and maintaining roads and bridges, filling vacancies in county offices, examining, settling, and allowing all
claims against the county, examining and auditing the accounts of all officers of the county, making rules and
regulations for the support of the poor, for the county police, and the health of the county, hiring and firing
county employees, and managing the every day operations of the county.
10. 1987 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS,
ELECTED OFFICIALS [GC87(l)-2] (1990).
11. Holder IIl, 114 S. Ct. at 2622.
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counties that continue to use the commissioner system. 2
Bleckley County was established in 1912 under a sole commissioner system. The

county, located in rural middle Georgia, has a population of 10,430, of whom
2,332 (22.4%) are African American. No African American has ever been elected
to the county commission or to any other countywide office. 8
Over the years there has been substantial interest in the county in adopting a
multimember board of commissioners. In 1974, 1975, and 1983, the Bleckley
County grand jury recommended that a citizens committee be established to study
the feasibility of adopting a board of commissioners for the county. 4 In 1982,
1983, and 1984, the grand juries recommended that a referendum be held to allow
the voters to determine whether to change the sole commissioner system.' 8
In 1985 the general assembly enacted legislation creating a board of
commissioners of Bleckley County, consisting of a chairperson elected at-large and
five members elected from the five single-member districts then in use for the
county board of education.16 Although it was not required by state law to do so, in
a bill sponsored by the local representative from Bleckley County, and as
recommended by the grand jury, the general assembly conditioned implementation
of the legislation on approval by a majority of the voters at a countywide
referendum.17 The referendum was held in 1986, and was defeated by a vote of
57% against to 43% in favor. 18

12. Id. at 2584. The Georgia General Assembly abolished the sole commissioner system in Cherokee
County in 1989, 1989 Ga. Laws 4295, in Dade, Heard, and Franklin Counties in 1991. 1991 Ga. Lars 3893,
3976, 4681, and in Catoosa and Murray Counties in 1992, 1992 Ga. Laws 4501. 4649. Sole commissioner
systems were abolished in Wheeler, Webster, Telfair, and Carroll Counties as a result of Section 2 litigation.
Howard v. Commissioner of Wheeler County, No. CV390-057 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13. 1993); Nealy v. Webster
County, No. 88-203-ALB-AMER (M.D. Ga. March 16. 1990); Clark v. Telfair County, Georgia Common.
No. CV 387-25 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 1988); Carrollton Branch NAACP v. Stallings, No. C84-122N-6 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 17, 1988).
13. Holder I11,114 S. Ct. at 2584.
14. Hall v. Holder, No. 85-242-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. 1991), Plaintiffs' Exhibits ("PI.Exs.") 335. 379. 209;
Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 249. The grand jury in Georgia, aside from making presentments in criminal cases.,
has broad investigatory powers, e.g., to inspect the county jail and other county buildings, and to examine the
records of various county officers. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-71 (1994). The grand jury also has the authority to
appoint special committees consisting of citizens of the county to investigate "county affairs." Ga. Op. Atty.
Gen. U89-10 (1989).
15. Id. PI.Exs. 132, 207; Tr. at 249, 408-09.
16. 1985 Ga. Laws 4406; Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
17. 1985 Ga. Laws 4410. The statutes abolishing the sole commissioners and creating boards of
commissioners in Catoosa and Murray Counties, for example, contained no referendum requirements. 1992
Ga. Laws 4501, 4649.
18. Hall v. Holder, 757 F. Supp. 1560, 1564 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (hereinafter Holder 1].
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II. THE VOTE DILUTION CHALLENGE
In 1985, a group of African-American residents of the county and the NAACP
Chapter of Cochran/Bleckley County filed a lawsuit challenging the sole
commissioner form of county government. They alleged that the system resulted in
the dilution of their voting strength and had a racially discriminatory purpose and
effect in violation of Section 2 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments."
Section 2 provides that a challenged practice is unlawful if it "results" in
minority voters having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."12 D In
Thornburg v. Gingles,2" the Court held that "[t] he essence of a § 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice, or structure, interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
'22
voters to elect their preferred representatives.
The legislative history of Section 2, particularly the 1982 Senate report,
indicates that "a variety of factors, depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or
procedure called into question," are relevant in determining a violation.28 After
reviewing the factors discussed in the Senate report, the Court in Gingles identified
three preconditions for a Section 2 challenge to a multimember legislative
redistricting plan: (1) whether the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more single member

19. The plaintiffs also challenged the district voting plan for the Bleckley County Board of Education
and the method of electing the Cochran City Council. These claims were settled by consent of the parties on
November 22, 1985, and July 17, 1986, respectively. Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1566 n.5 (1 th Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Holder II].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). The "results" standard was added to Section 2 by Congress in 1982 in
response to the decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), to make clear that proof of
intentional discrimination was not required for a statutory violation. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 44 & n.8 (1986).

21.

478 U.S. 30 (1986).

22. Id. at 47.
23. S. REP.No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 417]. Typical factors
identified in the Senate report include: the extent of any history of discrimination in the jurisdiction that
touched the right of the members of the minority group to participate in the democratic process; the extent to
which voting is racially polarized; the extent to which the jurisdiction uses devices that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination, such as majority vote requirements or anti-single shot provisions; whether the
members of the minority group have been denied access to existing candidate slating processes; the extent to
which members of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; whether
political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and, the extent to which
members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Id.
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districts; (2) whether the minority is politically cohesive, i.e., votes as a bloc; and
(3) whether the majority also votes as a bloc "usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate." 24 Ultimately, Section 2 "requires the court's overall
judgment, based on the totality of circumstances and guided by those relevant
factors in the particular case, of whether the voting strength of minority voters is
.'minimized or canceled out.' "25
Both the district court and court of appeals in Hall v. Holder applied the
Gingles analysis to plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. In doing so, they relied upon
CarrolltonBranch of NAACP v. Stallings,26 a virtually identical case challenging
the sole commissioner system in Carroll County, Georgia, in which the Eleventh
Circuit held "the single-member county commission . . .to be in all essential
respects comparable with the multimember district discussed by the court in
Gingles."21
At the conclusion of the trial in Hall v. Holder, the presiding judge frankly
acknowledged that blacks had little chance of winning countywide election. The
judge noted that having run for public office himself "under the circumstances, I
wouldn't run if I were black in [Bleckley] county. You're going to put your hardearned time and shoe leather campaigning throughout this county.., under these
circumstances? '28 Despite this bleak assessment of the opportunity for minority
political participation in Blecldey County, the district court dismissed the Section
2 claim, finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that: voting was racially polarized,
minority voters were politically cohesive, and that their voting strength was diluted
by the at-large elected, sole commissioner system. 2 The court also dismissed

24. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
25. S.REP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 29 n.1
18. Accord Johnson v. Dc Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 265657 (1994) ("the ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of opportunity Acre intended by Congress to
be judgments resting on comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts").
26. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. Duncan v. Carrollton Branch of NAACP. 485 U.S.
936 (1988).
27. Stallings, 829 F.2d at 1549. See Holder 1,757 F. Supp. at 1582; Holder 1/. 955 F.2d at 1567 (-we
have already held that § 2 challenges to sole commissioner forms of government are subject to the same
analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles"). The decisions of lower
courts on whether size challenges could be brought under Section 2 against multimember bodies wcre mixed.
The courts allowed size challenges in McNeil v. Springfield, Illinois, 658 F. Supp. 1015. 1022 (C.D. I1. 1987)
(city commission); and Overton v. Austin, 871 F.2d 529. 536 (5th Cir. 1989) (city council); but disallowed
them in Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418. 1425 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989) (city council); McNeil v.
Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937. 939, 946 (7th Cir. 1988) (park district). cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1031
(1989); and Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista, 723 F. Supp. 1384. 1389 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (city council).
28. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1571.
29. Holder II, 114 S. Ct. at 2585.
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plaintiffs' constitutional claim that the challenged method of elections had been
adopted or was being maintained with a discriminatory purpose on the ground that
there was no specific evidence of racial intent.30
Plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. The court held that
plaintiffs had satisfied the test for proving a violation of Section 2 prescribed by
Thornburgv. Gingles, that at a minimum the burden shifted to the County to offer
rebuttal evidence, and that the County offered "[n]o meaningful rebuttal
evidence."'" The court found that "the evidence conclusively establishes a pattern
of racially polarized voting,"'' 2 and that "the totality of the circumstances found in
Bleckley County clearly reveal a situation where the electoral power of Bleckley
County blacks has been abridged 'on account of race or color.' "s"
Finding a violation of Section 2, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
"for the imposition of a remedy," which "could well be modeled" after the existing
plan for the county board of education which consists of five single-member
districts. 34 Having decided the case on a statutory ground, the court did not reach
plaintiffs' constitutional vote dilution claim.35

I.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

A strong argument against plenary review by the Supreme Court was the
uniqueness of the sole commissioner form of government and the fact that it was
used in only a handful of counties in Georgia. As the Court has held, a case must
present issues "beyond the academic or the episodic" to be worthy of certiorari.'6
In addition, as noted supra, the Court had previously refused to hear a case from
Carroll County, Georgia, presenting an identical challenge to the sole
7
commissioner system.'
One important difference, undoubtedly, in the Carroll County and Bleckley
County cases was the intercession of the United States Solicitor General in the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Holder I, 757 F. Supp. at 1571.
Holder HI,955 F.2d at 1574.
Id. at 1573.
Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1574 n.20.
Id. at 1567 n.6.
Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955).
Duncan, 485 U.S. at 936.
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latter. 8 In Holder v. Hall, the Solicitor General, at the request of the Court,30

filed an amicus brief in January, 1993, in which he argued that, while the case was
not worthy of certiorari, the decision of the court of appeals was incorrect.
According to the Solicitor General, the decision below opened up the prospect of
Section 2 challenges to "the practice of electing single state governors and attorney
generals, city mayors, county sheriffs, coroners, and prosecutors, and a wide
variety of other officers in jurisdictions in which there is racially polarized
voting." 4 The Solicitor General also argued that the decision would allow the
expansion of the number of elected officials five or ten fold-or more-in order to
create majority-minority districts.4"
The petition for writ of certiorari raised a number of questions involving the
findings of racial bloc voting, political cohesiveness, and application of the totality
of circumstances test.42 In granting the petition, however, the Court limited the
questions presented to one framed by the Solicitor General--"[w]hether the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that governance by a single county commissioner,
rather than a multimember board of commissioners, is subject to challenge as
dilutive under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
Section 1973."' 43 Five members of the Court held that the size of an elected body
could not be challenged under Section 2. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, stated that it was impossible to establish an
objective alternative benchmark for comparing an allegedly discriminatory system
with a non-dilutive system, i.e., a hypothetically larger (or smaller) governing
authority."

38. Another important difference in the two cases was that in Stallngs. 829 F.2d at 1553, the court of
appeals reversed on the basis that there was evidence of a constitutional, as well as a Section 2, violation.
39. 113 S. Ct. 318 (1992).
40. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11. Holder 11 (91-2012).
41. Id. at 9 & n.8.
42. Holder v. Hall, 61 U.S.L.W. 3090 (U.S. June 16, 1992).
43. Holder v. Hall, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993). The question as posed by the Solicitor General was
"[w]hether the practice of electing a single county commissioner may be invalidated as dilutive under Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1969 [sic], 42 U.S.C. 1973." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
(i), Holder If (No. 91-2012). After the 1992 presidential election and the replacement of Solicitor General
Kenneth W. Starr by Acting Solicitor General William C. Bryson, the United States filed an arnicus brief on
the merits in Holder v. Hall in which it repudiated its earlier position. "On further reflection." according to
the brief, "we have concluded . . . that the practice of electing a sole county commissioner is subject to
challenge as dilutive in violation of Section 2." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at I n.l, Holder II (91-2012).
44. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2588 ("respondents fail to explain where the search for reasonable
alternative benchmarks should begin and end, and they provide no acceptable principles for deciding future
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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concluded that the size of a governing
body was not a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure" within the meaning of Section 2. 4 5 Justice O'Connor rejected this
position and agreed with Justice Blackmun "that our precedents compel the
conclusion that the size of the Bleckley County Commission is . . . a 'standard,
practice, or procedure' under § 2 .... ,,4 Those cases 47 were decisions holding that
a change in the size of an elected body was within the scope of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (Section 5),48 a companion provision which contains language
identical to that in Section 2 and requires preclearance of changes in any
"standard, practice, or procedure" with respect to voting. 49 The Court had
previously held in Chisom v. Roemer that it would be "an anomalous result" to
conclude that a practice covered by Section 5 was excluded from challenge under
Section 2.50 Although Justice Kennedy did not join Justice Thomas's concurrence,
Justice Kennedy did indicate that it was not dispositive of whether a practice
would be subject to Section 2 when the same practice was subject to Section 5

preclearance. That was true, in his opinion, because a benchmark for determining
retrogression or discriminatory effect would always be present under Section 5; "it
is the existing status that furnishes the benchmark for determining vote

cases") (opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 2590 ("[tjhe wide range of possibilities makes the choice inherently
standardless") (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
45. Id. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 2588.
47. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 503 (1992); City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1983); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1980).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
49. Section 5. part of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965, was a temporary provision that targeted
southern states which had long histories of discrimination against blacks in registering and voting. South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329-30 (1966). The basic purpose of Section 5 was to freeze voting
requirements and prevent the targeted, or "covered," jurisdictions from adopting new forms of discrimination
to replace those invalidated by the Voting Rights Act, such as literacy and good character tests for voting.
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976). Section 5 was amended and extended in 1970, 1975, and
1982, to include language minorities (defined as American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and
persons of Spanish heritage), and is scheduled to expire in 2007. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3) and § 1973b(a)(8)
(1988). Eighteen states, or parts of states, from New York to California are now covered by Section 5. 28
C.F.R. § 51 (1991). Covered jurisdictions can preclear their proposed changes in voting by submitting them to
the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for approval. In both
instances the jurisdiction has the burden of proving that a proposed change does not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172, 185. For a discussion of Section 5, see Laughlin McDonald,
The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Needfor Preclearance.51
T NN. L. REV. 1, 30-56 (1983).
50. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 402.
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dilution."51 In practice, however, the existing status will not always provide an
adequate basis for comparison.
A change from an appointed to an elected board of county commissioners, for
example, would be covered by Section 5,82 but a benchmark for determining
discriminatory effect would not be self-evident. If the change was to at-large
elections or single-member districts that fragmented the minority community and
diluted its voting strength, would it nonetheless be entitled to preclearance if (1)
under the old system no minorities had been appointed to the commission, and (2)
there was no evidence that the change was racially motivated? The difficulty with
retrogression analysis under these circumstances is that there is no pre-existing
electoral system that could be used as a basis for comparing the effect of the new
practice.
In other cases, there may be no "existing status" at all that could be used as a
benchmark for determining discriminatory effect. There would be, for example, no
benchmark where a newly incorporated college district or municipality selects a
method of conducting elections for the first time."' To establish a basis for
comparison, the Section 5 decisionmaker would have to model a voting plan that
fairly recognized the existing strength of the minority community, which is what
the court of appeals did in Hall v. Holder in conducting its Section 2 analysis.
Whatever the distinction between Sections 2 and 5, it cannot be that in the latter
the existing status always furnishes a benchmark for determining vote dilution.
Justice Thomas, along with Justice Scalia, argued that Section 2 does not cover
any dilution challenges, but is limited to "enactments that regulate citizens' access
to the ballot or the processes for counting a ballot."," The other justices disagreed,
either explicitly or by necessary implication."
Because the court of appeals rendered its decision entirely on statutory grounds,

51. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2587.
52. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 250 n.17 (1984); Horry County v. United States. 449 F. Supp.
990, 995 (D.D.C. 1978).
53. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(4) (1991). This section cites these as examples of covered changes where
"there exists no... lawful practice or procedure for use as a benchmark." Id.
54. Holder I1, 114 S. Ct. at 2619 (Thomas. J.. concurring in the judgment).
55. Id. at 2588 ("stare decisis concerns ... require me to reject Justice Thomas's suggestion that we
overhaul our established reading of § 2") (O'Connor, J.. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment):
id. at 2621 n.3 (the Gingles vote dilution analysis applies to "the case before us") (Blackmun. J., dissenting);
id. at 2627 ("[i]t is crystal clear that Congress intended the 1982 amendment to cover non-acess claims like
those in Bolden and Gomillion") (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2586 ("liln a § 2 vote dilution suit . , . a
court must find a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting
practice") (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
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the case was remanded for consideration of the plaintiffs' constitutional claim. 0
Given its ruling that the size of an elected body could not be challenged under
Section 2, the Court had no occasion to reach the issue whether the sole
commissioner was a single-member office, which for that reason was further
immune to a size challenge. The Court previously held in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n
v. Attorney General of Texas5" that an election for a single-member office holder
was not "entirely beyond the coverage of § 2 of the Act," giving as examples of
challengeable practices closing the polls early to restrict the opportunities of
minorities to vote, or drawing district lines to dilute minority voting strength.55
While this issue remains viable on remand in connection with the Bleckley County
plaintiffs' constitutional claim,5 9 it is probably academic in that the sole
commissioner of Bleckley County, an entity with plenary legislative power, has
none of the unique or distinctive characteristics of a true single member office.10

56. Id. at 2588.
57. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
58. Id. at 427.
59. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings. Hall v. Holder, No. 91-8303 (11 th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994). On remand, the district
court reaffirmed its decision that the sole commissioner form of government did not violate the Constitution,
Hall v. Holder, No. 85-242-2-Mac (M.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 1995), and the plaintiffs appealed. Hall v. Holder, No.
95-8374.
60. Single-member offices have traditionally been regarded as those which exercise, either exclusively or
primarily, executive powers, and which have never been regarded as being divisible. See Holder I11, 114 S.Ct.
at 2622 ("[b]y tradition and practice, these executive positions (such as governors and mayors) arc occupied
by one person") (Blackmun, J., dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate");
Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 (11 th Cir. 1987) (single-member offices "are most commonly
limited to non-legislative functionaries," such as sheriffs, probate judges, and tax collectors); Southern
Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 518 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (a single-member
office "refers to a situation where under no circumstances will there ever be more than one such position in a
particular geographic voting area"). By contrast, those offices which exercise plenary legislative powers, such
as a county governing authority, have traditionally been regarded as multimember bodies. See HolderIII, 114
S. Ct. at 2623 ("[a] one-member legislature, far from being the norm, is an anomaly") (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (a numerous
legislature is "best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the
people and to secure their privileges and interests").
The courts have routinely allowed vote dilution challenges to legislative bodies, even where they, or their
individual members, also exercised substantial executive powers. See, e.g., City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 59
(constitutional and Section 2 challenge to city commission where the commissioners "jointly exercise all
legislative, executive and administrative power in the city"); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380,
382 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (invalidating at-large elections for city commission even though commissioners "serve
as the administrative heads of their respective departments"); McNeil, 658 F. Supp. at 1020, 1033 (striking
down commission even though each commissioner is "a specific executive office").
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The four dissenters in Holder argued that minority voters could challenge the
size of an existing government body under Section 2, and that a challenged
practice "must be measured against the benchmark of an alternative structure or
practice that is reasonable and workable under the facts of the specific case." 0 1
Based on the facts in Holder, it clearly was possible to establish a reasonable and
workable benchmark that would have met the concerns over judicially manageable
standards raised by the majority.
According to Justice O'Connor, the plaintiffs' "principal support" for the
argument that a workable benchmark existed "is that a five-member commission is
the most common size for Georgia.116 2 While that was indeed one of plaintiffs'
contentions, their principal argument was that the general assembly authorized a
five member board of commissioners for Bleckley County. Thus, the state itself set
a reasonable and workable benchmark for increasing the size of the county
63
governing authority.
Justice Kennedy characterized the action of the general assembly as
"irrelevant,"" but his reasons for doing so are unpersuasive. First, Justice
Kennedy said that the failure to adopt a board of commissioners "says nothing
about the effects the sole commissioner system has on the voting power of Bleckley
County's citizens. '6 5 To the contrary, the failure to adopt a board of
commissioners indicates the voting power of minority citizens of the county was
diluted. Second, Justice Kennedy argued that "a minority group's voting strength
would be no more or less diluted had the State not authorized the county to alter
the size of its commission."6 6 That may be true, but it is also a non sequitur. The
point of the state's authorization of a five-member board of commissioners for
Bleckley County is that it set a clear benchmark for an increase in the size of the

There is nothing immutable under Georgia law about the number of sole commissioners, as there is about
the office of governor or the sheriff's office. Individual counties have frequently switched back and forth
between a sole commissioner and a board of commissioners as their county governing authority. See. e.g..
Stallings, 829 F.2d at 1551. The county governing authority in Georgia can best be described. not as a singlemember office, but as a body exercising plenary legislative powers, the size of which may vary from one to
three to five or more members.
61. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2619, 2622 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
62. Id. at 2590. Of the state's 159 counties, 76 had 5 commissioners. Id at 2622.
63. Plaintiffs also argued that the county adopted a board of education consisting of five membars
elected from single-member districts, providing, as the court of appeals found, a reasonable and workable
model for a board of commissioners. Id. at 2585, 2622.
64. Id. at 2586.

65.

Id.

66.

Holder I1, 114 S. CL at 2586.
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governing authority.
A benchmark for an increase in the size of a legislative body is ordinarily
limited to what is authorized by state law. 67 The court of appeals did not establish
an open-ended standard in Section 2 cases in which the size of a governing body
could be infinitely expanded until a majority-minority district were created.
Instead, the court used as a benchmark the size of the county governing authority
dictated by the state's own apportionment options.
Even in the absence of a clearly defined state benchmark, a court would have
inherent equitable power to vary the size of a challenged governing body within
the limits of reasonableness in order to comply with federal law. In Sixty-Seventh
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens,68 the district court, in fashioning a remedy for a
one-person, one-vote violation, reduced the size of the state senate from 67 to 35
members, and reduced the house from 135 to 105 members. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision because of the extent of the change imposed, which it
described as "radical surgery in reapportionment." 9 The Court acknowledged,
however, that a court has the power to vary the size of a challenged body, and that
it did not "disapprove a court-imposed minor variation from a State's prescribed
figure when that change is shown to be necessary to meet constitutional
requirements. ' 70 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart agreed that "there is no
rigid and absolute limit on a court's equitable discretion to order changes in the
size of legislative bodies in order to remedy an unconstitutional apportionment.
Every case is different, and these questions are inevitably questions of degree. 7 1
The majority's concern over benchmark also ignores the actual experience in
other sole commissioner cases. None of the Section 2 challenges to sole
commissioner systems have in fact resulted in the unreasonable increase in the size
of the governing body. In City of CarrolltonBranch of NAACP v. Stallings,7 2 the
district court approved a settlement providing for six commissioners elected from
single-member districts and a chair elected at-large serving as the full-time chief
67. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993) ("the federal courts are bound to respect the
States' apportionment choices unless those choices contravene federal requirements").
68. 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
69. Id. at 198.
70. Id. at 199.
71. Id. at 203. Applying a standard of reasonableness, or "degree," based upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case may prove difficult. However, as the Court has said in the context of applying
Section 2 to the method of electing judges, "that task, difficult as it may prove to be, cannot justify a judicially
created limitation on the coverage of the broadly worded statute, as enacted and amended by Congress."
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403.
72. No. C84-122N-6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1988).
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administrative officer of the County. In Clark v. Telfair County, Georgia
Commission," a court-approved settlement provided for a five-member board of
commissioners elected from single-member districts, a chair elected by the board,
and an administrative officer hired by the commission. In Nealy v. Webster
County, Georgia Commission,"4 the court approved a settlement establishing a
four-member board of commissioners, with a three-member legislative component
and an at-large elected chair with essentially executive duties. Finally, in Howard
v. Commissioner of Wheeler County, Georgia,7 8 the court approved a settlement
providing for a three-member board of commissioners elected from single-member
districts, with a chief executive chosen from among the elected members. A
reasonable and workable benchmark did in fact exist in Holder v. Hall, but a
78
majority of the Court refused to accept it.
A.

A Retreat from Voting Rights Enforcement

The decision in Holder v. Hall is the first in which the Supreme Court has
found a voting practice to be outside the scope of Section 2. In prior cases the
Court allowed Section 2 challenges to multimember legislative redistricting
plans," single-member legislative redistricting plans,7 8 court-ordered legislative
redistricting plans,7 9 court-ordered congressional redistricting plans, 80 at-large
elections for local governing bodies,81 the method of electing appellate court
judges, 82 and the method of electing trial court judges. 3
Lower federal courts have allowed (although not always sustained) Section 2
challenges to a variety of other voting practices: (1) the form in which a

73. No. CV 387-25 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 1988).
74. No. 88-203-ALB-AMER (M.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 1990).
75. No. CV 390-057 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 1993).
76. In remanding the case for further proceedings, the majority obviously did not regard the lack of an
ascertainable benchmark as a bar to a constitutional challenge. Still, assuming a finding of discriminatory
adoption or maintenance of the sole commissioner in Bleckley County. the lower court %ould be faced with the
identical problem as in a Section 2 challenge of identifying a non-discriminatory alternative system as a
remedy.
77. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 US. 30 (1986).
78. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084-85 (1993).
79. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. Theodore. 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993).
80. Brooks v. Winter, 461 U.S. 921 (1983).
81. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 615 (1982).
82. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
83. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney General, 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
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referendum question is presented to voters,"' (2) the refusal to appoint blacks as
poll officials, 85 (3) the harassment by poll officials of black voters for spending
more than five minutes in the voting booth,"8 (4) a state law requiring candidates
to receive a majority of the votes cast as a condition for election to office, 87 (5)
purging voters from the voter rolls because of their failure to vote in prior
elections8 8 (6) withholding candidate campaign finance information and forms
from black candidates for municipal office, 8 9 (7) failing to deputize municipal
clerks as deputy registrars and to implement satellite registration,90 (8) selectively
removing blacks from registration lists because of unreported change of address,9 1
(9) invalidating absentee ballots cast by blacks without making a case-by-case
determination of which ballots were invalid,92 (10) the adoption of "anti-single
shot" and "numbered place" laws,9 3 (11) failing to inform voters of new
procedures for casting ballots,9 ' (12) failing to provide absentee ballots to voters,05
at-large elected board of commissioners form of government,98 (13) the location of
a polling place,9 (14) retention elections for appointed judges,9 (15) denial of

84. Lucas v. Townsend, 908 F.2d 851, 852 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. granted and vacated sub. nom. Board
of Pub. Educ. and Orphanage v. Lucas, 501 U.S. 1226 (1991).
85. Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 132 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
86. Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 529 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
87. Whitfield v. Democratic Party of Ark., 890 F.2d 1423, 1427-28 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1126 (1991).
88. Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 828 F.2d. 306 (3d. Cir.
1994).
89. Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
90. Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1268 (N.D. Miss. 1987), affid, 932 F.2d 400 (5th
Cir. 1991).
91. Toney v. White, 476 F.2d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir.), vacated in part on reh'g, 488 F.2d 310 (1973).
92. Goodloe v. Madison County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 610 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
93. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 679 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1988). A numbered post requirement
forces candidates to run for a particular scat, rather than for a given number of vacancies. Candidates arc
isolated in head-to-head contests making it more difficult for a cohesive minority to elect candidates of its
choice by concentrating its votes on one or a few office seekers. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 183-85
(denying preclearance to a numbered post provision because of its racially dilutive effect), Anti-single shot
rules require voters to vote for as many positions as are being elected and similarly prohibit minorities from
concentrating their votes on one or a few preferred candidates. See Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp, 206
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (finding North Carolina's anti-single shot law unconstitutional).
94. United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46, 47, 50 (W.D. La. 1969).
95. Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. La. 1968).
96. Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Jordan v. City of Greenwood,
599 F. Supp. 397, 404 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
97. Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D.R.I. 1982).
98. Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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access to a party slate-making process," 9 and (16) the practice of limiting the
number of minority deputy voter registrars.10 0
These decisions were rooted in the broad remedial purpose of the Voting Rights
Act of "rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in voting." 10
' The decision of
the Court dismissing the Section 2 claim in Holder v. Hall is a decided retreat
from that purpose. While couched in technical, jurisdictional terms, the decision
has prohibitive practical consequences for African-American residents of Bleckley
County. Insofar as the Voting Rights Act is concerned, these African Americans
have no remedy for their inability realistically to elect any candidates of their
choice to the executive or legislative branches of their county government. Such
exclusion from participation in the political process can hardly be a result
contemplated by the Voting Rights Act." 2
The decision of the majority has broader negative implications for minority
political participation. Discrimination-prone jurisdictions not subject to Section 5
may well be encouraged to reduce the size of their legislative bodies to make it
difficult or impossible to create majority-minority districts. A jurisdiction could
even abolish its legislative body elected from districts and consolidate all
governmental power in the hands of one at-large elected official. In that way, a
bloc-voting majority, as in Bleckley County, could dominate the election of all the
jurisdiction's legislative and executive positions. In either case, the minority could
not challenge the size of the body under Section 2, and unless it could prove that
the change was intentionally discriminatory it would be without any remedy under
the Constitution as well.' 03
Even Section 5 would not be an adequate check on such obviously
discriminatory voting practices adopted by covered jurisdictions. Although a
change in the size of an elected body would be subject to preclearance, a transfer
of decisionmaking authority would not be. 10 A covered jurisdiction could therefore
escape Section 5 review simply by retaining its legislative body but transferring

99. Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. I1. 1989).
100. Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
101. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 383 U.S. 301. 315 (1966)).
102. As Chief Justice Warren observed in Katzenbach. the Voting Rights Act was designed to ensure
that minorities would "be able to participate for the first time on an equal basis in the government under
which they live." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
103. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 70 (requiring proof of racial purpose to establish constitutional voting
rights violation).
104. Presley, 502 U.S. at 506 ("[c]hanges which affect only the distribution of power among officials
are not subject to § 5 because such changes have no direct relation to. or impact on. voting").
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some or all of its powers to a single at-large elected office. There could be no
review of the transfer of power under Section 5, and no challenge to the method of
05 Such a result,
electing the sole official under the effect standard of Section 2.1
permissible under Holder, would be contrary to the intent of the Voting Rights
Act to eradicate all forms of discrimination in voting.
Since passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, flexibility and pragmatism,
rather than formalism, have been the touchstones of voting rights enforcement.100
In amending Section 2 in 1982, for example, Congress indicated that determining
a statutory violation "depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality.' "n107 It adopted a "functional view of [the] 'political process'"
and rejected the more formalistic standard espoused in City of Mobile v. Bolden
which required proof of a discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of voting
rights.' 08 Similarly, Congress declined to prescribe "mechanistic rules for
formulating remedies in [Section 2] cases which necessarily depend upon widely
varied proof and local circumstances," and instead indicated that a "court should
exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely
remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength.' ' 9
In Gingles, the Court adopted the "'functional' view of the political process"
described in the Senate report and approved "a flexible, fact-intensive test for § 2
violations."110 In Holder, the Court blinked at past and present reality in Bleckley
County, and adopted an inflexible, mechanistic rule prohibiting all Section 2
challenges to the size of a legislative body. In so doing, it undermined effective
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.

105. While this example may appear to be extreme, it is closely analogous to the facts in Presley, where
two majority white counties in Alabama, following the adoption of remedial districting plans creating
majority-black districts, transferred some of the power formerly exercised by individual commissioners to the
white- controlled board of commissioners or an administrative official appointed by the board. Id. at 498, 510.
106. For a discussion of the equity tradition in American law and voting rights, see PETER C. HOFFER,
THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990); J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond
Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F L,REv. 551, 554
(1993).
107. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 30.
108. Id. at 30 n.120.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46.
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IV.

THE THOMAS CONCURRING OPINION

The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas is a remarkable exercise in judicial
activism which discounts the legislative history of the Act and two decades of
judicial precedent. The opinion makes three basic arguments: (1) vote dilution
"does not comport with the terms of the statute;"111 (2) Section 2 improperly
requires courts to make purely political decisions about which method of elections
is the most effective, i.e., at-large systems in which minorities influence the election
of more officers, or district systems in which minorities control the election of
fewer officers;' and (3) districting schemes have resulted in "segregating the
races into political homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system
of 'political apartheid.'

"113

While the majority rejected his analysis, one cannot lightly dismiss the import of
Justice Thomas's opinion. In practical terms, it means that minority plaintiffs in
all Section 2 vote dilution cases for the foreseeable future will come before the
Court with two votes against them no matter how egregious the facts of their cases
may be and no matter how complete the dilution of their voting strength. In
Johnson v. De Grandy,1 4 for example, a vote dilution challenge to Florida's 1992
legislative redistricting decided on the same day as Holder, Justice Thomas
dissented, again joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas would have vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground
that "an apportionment plan is not a 'standard, practice, or procedure' that may be
challenged under § 2." 111
A.

The Statutory Construction Argument

According to Justice Thomas, the terms "standard, practice, or procedure" in
Section 2 "[p]roperly understood . . . refer only to practices that affect minority
citizens' access to the ballot."""" In Allen v. State Board of Elections,'" however,

111.

Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2592.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 2598 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816. 2827 (1993)).
114. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
115. Id. at 2667. Johnson v. De Grandy is discussed in more detail in this volumc. See Brenda Wright.
Johnson v. De Grandy: Mixed Messages on Equal Electoral Opportunity Under Section 2 of the ;oting

Rights Act, 3 D.C. L. REV. 101 (1995).
116. Holder 111, 114 S. Ct. at 2603.
117. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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the defendants made a similar argument, and the Court rejected it.
In Allen the state of Mississippi maintained that Section 5 "covers only those
state enactments which prescribe who may register to vote." 11 8 In concluding that
"Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of
a covered State in even a minor way," ' the Court examined: (1) the language of
the Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1) that voting includes "'all action
necessary to make a vote effective,' ",120 (2) the record of the Senate and House
hearings, 1 ' and (3) the remarks of both opponents and proponents during floor
debates. 2
In addition, when it amended and extended the Voting Rights Act, Congress
approved the interpretation of the scope of the Act contained in Allen. In 1970,
"[a]fter extensive deliberation.. . on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during

which the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five
years, without any substantive modification of § 5. '' 123 Congress was "fully aware"
of the interpretation of the Act "as reaching voter changes other than those
affecting the registration process and plainly contemplated that the Act would
continue to be so construed."'

24

And in 1975, "both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, in
recommending extension of the Act, noted with approval the broad interpretations
to the scope of Section 5 in Allen and Perkins v. Matthews." 20 Congress was
"well aware" of the application of the Act to redistricting and reapportionment,
118. Id. at 564.
119. Id. at 566.
120. Id. (quoting 79 Stat. 445, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1964)).
121. Id. at 566 & n.31, 567-68. During the Senate hearings the Attorney General testified that Section
2 "'was intended to be all-inclusive of any kind of practice.'" Id. at 566 (quoting Hearings on S. 1564 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, 191-92 (1965)). In the House hearings the
" '
Attorney General similarly emphasized that Section 5 was to have a broad scope and that precious few"'
changes, e.g., changing from paper ballots to voting machines, could be excluded. Id. at 567-68 (quoting
Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. Ist Sess.,
sec. 2, 60, 95 (1965)). Significantly, when Section 5 was enacted, Congress did not make even these minor
exceptions indicating, according to the Court, that "all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to § 5
scrutiny." Id. at 568.
122. Allen, 393 U.S. at 568.
123. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973).
124. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 132 (1978). See Hearings on H.R. 4249 et al.
Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-31,
133, 147-49, 154-55, 182-84, 402-54 (1969); Hearings on S. 818 et al. Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 48, 195-96, 369-70,
397-98, 426-27, 469 (1970).
125. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 176 (1985).
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2
and renewed the statute based upon that awarehess.2'
When Congress re-enacts a statute and voices its approval of an administrative
or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that
interpretation to which courts are thereby bound.1 27 Thus, if there were any doubts
that Section 2 was intended to reach vote dilution challenges, Congress removed
them when it amended and extended the Act in 1982.
The House report that accompanied the 1982 amendment of Section 2 provides

that a "standard, practice or procedure ...

is intended to include not only voter

registration requirements and procedures, but also methods of election and
electoral structures, practices and procedures which discriminate."11 8 The report
specifically included "at-large elections" and "districting" plans among the
practices identified as being subject to Section 2.129
The Senate report contains language to the same effect. It included within the
definition of practices that could dilute minority voting strength, and to which the
prohibitions of the Act applied, "election boundaries" and "at-large elections." 180
Properly understood, Section 2 refers to practices that dilute minority voting
strength, as well as to those that affect minority citizens' access to the ballot.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas was critical of the use of legislative
history, including the committee reports, to determine the extent of coverage of
Section 2. In his view it was evident from the face of the statute that Section 2 did
not reach vote dilution and resort to legislative history was therefore unnecessary
and improper. 131 Justice Thomas's entire discussion, however, centers on the
meaning of the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure" contained in Section
2(a) and essentially ignores the fact that the statute by its express terms reaches
any voting practice which results in "a denial or abridgment" of the right to
2
vote.13
Denial and abridgment have quite different meanings. To deny is to refuse to
grant; to abridge is to diminish, a synonym for dilute. 5 3 It is illogical to argue that
126. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey. 430 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1977). Congress us also aware of
the administrative interpretation of the Act by the Attorney General to require prelearanee of all voting
practices that had the potential for diluting minority voting strength. Id. at 157-58.
127. Board of Comn'rs of Sheffield County, 435 U.S. at 134-35.
128. H.R. REP. No.227, 97th Cong., IstSess. 30 (1981) (footnote omitted).
129. Id. The report described at-large elections as "one of the most effective methods of diluting
minority strength," indicating that they were a special concern and target of the 1982 amendments. Id. at 18.
130. S. RtP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 6.
131. Holder 111, 114 S. Ct. at 2612 & n.28.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
133. WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 602. 606 (3d ed. 1988).
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a statute which by its terms prohibits vote abridgment, reaches only practices that
result in vote denial. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the meaning of
the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure," and the Court has concluded that
there is,'" resort to legislative history is plainly proper.
Committee reports are not only entitled to great weight in determining
congressional intent,' 315 but the Court has described the Senate report as being
"the authoritative source" for construction of the 1982 amendments to the Act. 8 0
In Gingles, the Court relied extensively on the Senate report and cited it numerous
times in construing amended Section 2.1"7
It has been the established practice of the Court to examine the applicable
committee reports to determine congressional intent and the meaning of specific
provisions of the Voting Rights Act where the statute itself was silent or
ambiguous. In Beer v. United States, in determining how to measure
discriminatory effect, to which Section 5 was silent, the Court relied mainly upon
the House report of the 1975 extension of the Act. 81 Again, in City of Rome v.
United States, the Court resolved the question whether individual jurisdictions
could bail out from Section 5 coverage by examining the House and Senate
reports.1"' In Board of Commissioners of Sheffield County, Ala., in concluding
that subjurisdictions were subject to preclearance by virtue of statewide Section 5
coverage, the Court found particularly "significant" in relation to other legislative
history the discussion of the issue in the House and Senate reports."40 In McDaniel
v. Sanchez,"" the Court discussed the 1975 committee reports at length in holding
that any voting change, including those ordered into effect by a local federal court,
which reflected the policy choices of elected officials were subject to Section 5.1

134.

Dougherty County, 439 U.S. at 37.

135. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 & n.3 (1984) ("the authoritative source for finding the
legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation,'" (quoting Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 629 n.36 (D.C. Cir.
1978)("[sjince the conclusions in the conference report were commended to the entire Congress, they carry
greater weight than other of the legislative history").
136.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 n.7.

137.

Id. at 43-46.

138. 425 U.S. at 139-41 (citing H.R. RaP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1975)).
139. 446 U.S. at 168-69 (citing H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1965) and S. REP No.
162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 16 (1965)).
140. 435 U.S. at 134 (citing S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975), and H.R. REP No. 196,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
141. 452 U.S. 130 (1981).
142. Id. at 146, 147-48 & n.26, 149-50, 151 & n.33 (citing S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., IstSess. 5,
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And in Chisom, the Court found that state court judges were "representatives"

within the meaning of Section 2 based, inter alia, upon the 1982 Senate report.1 4
It would indeed be a complete break with the Court's own precedents and

practices to ignore the legislative history in construing the Voting Rights Act.
The decisions of the Court have consistently approved the Allen interpretation
that the Act reaches practices that can dilute minority voting strength."' The only
exception was City of Mobile v. Bolden, in which a plurality of the Court held that
Section 2 was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which protected only the right to register and vote without
hindrance.' 45 When it amended Section 2 in 1982, Congress expressed its
disagreement with this construction of the statute and indicated that "although the
plurality [in Bolden] suggested that the Fifteenth Amendment may be limited to
the right to cast a ballot and may not extend to claims of voting dilution . . this
section without question is aimed at discrimination which takes the form of
dilution, as well as outright denial of the right to register or to vote." 140 In its

subsequent decisions, the Court has confirmed that Section 2 reaches claims of
vote dilution.

14 7

As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, when a statute has been thus construed for
25 years, and reenacted and extended by Congress with express approval of that
construction, "judges have an especially clear obligation to obey settled law."14 8 If
stare decisis is to have any real meaning, Justice Thomas's argument that Section
2 does not apply to vote dilution must be rejected-as indeed it was by seven
members of the Court.'"

8-11 (1975) and H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong.. 1st Seas. 6-8, 17-18 (1975).
143. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 393-96. nn.20-23 (citing S. REP No. 417, supra note 23).
144. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467-69 (1987); City of Port Arthur v.
United States, 459 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1982); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 156. 162-70 (1980); Dougherty
County Bd. of Education v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 37-40 (1978); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-94
(1971). In Presley, while the Court held that a transfer of decision-making authority among elected officials
was not a covered practice under Section 5, it confirmed that "[ojur decision [in Allen], and its rationale, have
proven sound, and we adhere to both." Presley, 502 U.S. at 501.
145. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60-65.
146. S.REP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 30 n.120.
147. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 n.9; id. at 45 n.10 ("Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination.
not just vote dilution"); id. at 84 ("[w]e know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be
brought under § 2") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403 ("[tlhe statute was
enacted to protect voting rights that are not adequately protected by the Constitution itslr').
148. Holder I1, 114 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
149. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (while stare decisis is not "an inexorable
command," it "is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
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B.

The Political Judgment Argument

Section 2, as amended in 1982, by its express terms protects the equal right of
minorities "to elect representatives of their choice." 150 Thus, courts are not left to
guess, as Justice Thomas claimed, based on "political philosophy," whether
minorities are better served by influencing the election of a greater number of
officers or controlling the election of fewer officers. 151 Congress has made the
determination that the right protected by the statute is the equal right to elect

candidates of choice, and that an appropriate way of securing that right is through
15 2
the creation of majority-minority districts.
Congress's judgment on this matter was considered. During the congressional
hearings, opponents argued that the amendment of Section 2 would actually limit
the political opportunities of minorities by allowing them "to become isolated" in
single-member districts, and would "prevent minority members from exercising
influence on the political system beyond the bounds of their quota."10 3 Members of

development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process").
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
151. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2596. Proponents of influence theory contend that minorities have as
much, or more, political clout by being a potential "swing" group of voters, e.g., 10%-20%, in a greater
number of districts, rather than being in the majority in a fewer number of districts. Id. at 2595-96. While
Congress rejected this approach in favor of ensuring electability, the theory of minority influence has been
criticized as being "murky" and lacking ascertainable standards. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 117-18 (1992) ("When there are 'electability'
claims at issue, there is a natural threshold. Without such a threshold, how does one decide whether shifting
minorities from one district to another increases or decreases their overall influence?") (footnote omitted).
Concern over minority influence admittedly has more force in cases where it is not possible to create majorityminority districts. However, in cases where a cohesive minority is geographically compact, fragmenting it to
create so-called influence districts is simply an euphemism for diluting the minority's voting strength and
depriving it of the opportunity to elect candidates of its choice. See FRANK PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT:
POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 at 51, 125 (1990). The Supreme Court, moreover, has
never held that minority influence is protected under Section 2. See Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155 ("[w]e have
not yet decided whether influence-dilution claims ... are viable under § 2").
152. See Solomon v. Liberty County, Fla., 865 F.2d 1566, 1583 (11th Cir. 1988) ("the policy choice [of
guaranteeing minorities the right to elect candidates of choice] belongs to Congress"), vacated on reh'g, 873
F.2d 248 (1989). Accord, Kousser, supra note 106, at 551 ("[T]here is no doubt that Congress has decided
that the standard should be that minority voters should have a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice-that is, to determine the choice regardless of the desires of majorities of majority group voters--and
that district systems protect that right better than at-large systems.").
153. Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 511 (statement of Dr. Edward J. Erler) and 1115 (statement of Robert M.
Brinson) (1982) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act Hearings].
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the Senate subcommittee similarly argued that adoption of a results standard for
Section 2 would lead to the creation of majority-minority districts, or "political
ghettoes for minorities," and that while "[m]inority representation in the most
primitive sense may be enhanced by the proposed amendments; minority influence
will suffer enormously."'"
Congress weighed these arguments, but determined that minorities should be
guaranteed the equal right to elect representatives of their choice, and that
districting systems were an appropriate way of securing that right. According to
the Senate report, the testimony and other evidence presented to the subcommittee
belied the predictions and speculations that the amendment of Section 2 would
limit the political opportunities of minorities. 8 5 The subcommittee found there was
"an extensive, reliable and reassuring track record of court decisions using the very
standard which the Committee bill would codify."'"
The principal decision on which the committee relied was White v. Regester,1"
the first decision of the Court invalidating multimember legislative districts on the
grounds that they diluted minority voting strength and requiring the adoption of
single member districts to bring the minority community "into the full stream of
political life of the county and State by encouraging their further registration,
voting, and other political activities."""' In 1982 Congress adopted the legal
standard for proving vote dilution established in Regester as the "results test" of
amended Section 2.1' 9 The committee also relied upon 23 other reported vote
dilution cases, most of them from the southern states of the old Fifth Circuit. 100 In
those in which the plaintiffs prevailed, the courts implemented or authorized
remedial plans using districts." 1

154. S. REP.No. 417, supra note 23, at 103 (additional views of Sen. Orrin G.Hatch of Utah).
155. Id. at 31-32.
156. Id. at 32.
157. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
158. Id. at 769, 773.
159. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 ("Congress substantially revised § 2 ... to establish as the relevant legal
standard the 'results test.' applied by this Court in White v. Regester") (citation omitted). Indeed, the
language of Section 2(b) that a violation of the statute is shown by evidence -that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
was practically verbatim from Regester, 412 U.S. at 766.
160. S. REP.No. 417, supra note 23, at 32; Voting Rights Act Hearings. supra note 152, at 1216-26.
161. E.g., Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir. 1976) ("la]bsent a finding of sp cial
circumstances or insurmountable difficulties, the court should shape its remedial plan using single-member
districts only"); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1973) ("single-member districts are
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The Senate report, moreover, provides that in implementing remedies for
Section 2 violations, a "court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to
fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority
voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to
participate and to elect candidates of their choice."' 62 One of the voting cases cited

in the report as representing the "complete and full" remedy standard was Kirksey
v. Board of Supervisors,6 ' in which the court rejected a proposed redistricting
plan for the board of supervisors of Hinds County, Mississippi because the two
minority districts contained only "skin-of-the-teeth" black majorities, and
therefore failed to provide blacks a "'realistic opportunity'" to elect
representatives of their choice.'"
In light of the legislative history and the plain language of the statute, the Court
has consistently held that Section 2 guarantees the right "of a protected class to
elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters."'6 5 And where
violations are established, Congress itself has determined that complete and full
remedies, including majority-minority single-member districts, may properly be
implemented.' 6
C.

The Apartheid/SegregationArgument
Despite Justice Thomas's suggestion to the contrary,

67

majority-minority

districts bear no principled resemblance to apartheid. Apartheid is the exclusion of
one race from governance and the domination of that race by another.16 8 In South

preferable to large multi-member districts"), affid sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424
U.S. 636 (1975); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 31.
163. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
164. Id. at 150-51. The court also rejected the claim that "an ameliorative plan would be a racial
gerrymander." Id. at 151.
165. Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155.
166. In De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2661, the Court acknowledged that "society's racial and ethnic
cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral
opportunity." See also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 ("[t]he single member district is generally the appropriate
standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect") (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827).
167. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2598 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827).
168. See STUDY COMMISSION ON US. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA, SouTH AFRICA: TIME
RUNNING OUT 41 (1981) (" '[t]otal racial separation'" is the essence of racial apartheid) (quoting Professor
G. A. Cronje of the University of Pretoria); JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTI AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER 6, 103 (1978) (Under apartheid minorities "enjoy no representation in the central" government, and
"there is a clear denial of full political rights on account of their race").
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Africa, the premier example of apartheid, the first national election in which black
South Africans could vote was on April 26, 1994. Prior to that, Coloureds and
Indians, but not Africans, elected representatives of their own race to serve in
separate legislative bodies known as the House of Representatives and the House
of Delegates respectively. The country was controlled, however, by the all-white
House of Assembly elected exclusively by whites. 69 Justice Thomas's attempt to
characterize the districting plan plaintiffs sought in Holder as a form of
apartheid-given the meaning of the term-is ahistorical and misleading. It not
only trivializes apartheid, but it distorts the effect of single-member districts.
Remedial districting plans include minorities in the mainstream of political life;
they do not exclude them. They provide minorities the equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice to the general government, not consign them to
representation in separate, segregated legislative bodies. Any analogy with
apartheid and majority-minority districts is simply false.""
The notion that districting plans containing majority-minority districts are a
form of segregation, and that they "exacerbate racial tensions" is also
misplaced.' 7 ' In the context of political participation, segregation involved, among
other things, denying blacks the right to register and vote 172 and participate in
primary elections,7 3 and the right to live in neighborhoods of one's choice.174 By
contrast, the creation of a majority-minority district does not compel anyone to live
there or to continue living there. Nor does it deny anyone the right to run for office
or to vote for a candidate of his or her choice. No person has his or her vote
diluted simply by reason of living in a majority-white or a majority-minority
district.
There is also no factual basis for arguing that majority-minority districts are a
form of segregation and increase racial tensions. Congress considered and rejected
such arguments when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.175 Critics of the
amendment argued that a results standard for Section 2 would "deepen the

169. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al. Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with De'astatlng
Racial Consequences, 62 FoRDHAM L RaV. 1593. 1623 (1994).
170. Justice White similarly accused the majority in Shaw v. Reno of "their loose and imprecise u=" of
the term apartheid, which he feared "has ... led it astray." Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2840.
171. Holder I1, 114 S. Ct. at 2599.
172. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-13.
173. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
174. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
175. S. REP. No.417, supra note 23, at 31-32.
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tensions, fragmentation and outright resentment among racial groups," 170 would
"pit race against race,'17 "would exacerbate, race consciousness,'' 7 "may well

foster polarization,"' 71 and would "compel the worst tendencies toward race-based
allegiances and divisions." 18 0 Congress rejected these arguments on the ground
that there was no evidence to support them and concluded that the amendment
would not "be a devisive [sic] factor in total communities by emphasizing the role
of racial politics." 18 '
Not only did Congress make legislative findings that combating vote dilution
does not create racial tension, but there was no evidence of any kind in Holder
that majority-minority districts cause polarization. The evidence, summarized
below, established a long history of discrimination in Bleckley County, its
continuing effects, and deep, pre-existing racial divisions within the county:
a. "Bleckley County had enforced racial segregation in all aspects of local
government and local government services until forced to change by federal
legislation in the 1960s."12
b. "Bleckley County had debated and fought desegregation in all aspects of
public life, continuing its resistance until as late as the early 1970s."ro a

176. Voting Rights Act Hearings, supra note 152, at 662 (statement of John H. Bunzcl).
177. Id. at 745 (statement of Michael Levin).
178. Id. at 1250 (statement of Prof. Henry Abraham).
179. Id. at 1328 (statement of Donald L. Horowitz).
180. Id. at 1449 (letter from Prof. William Van Alstyne).
181. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 31-32. See also Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 356
(E.D.N.C. 1984) ("Congress necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded . .. the risk that
creating 'safe' black-majority single member districts would perpetuate racial ghettos and racial polarization
in voting behavior"), affd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (footnote omitted). Social
science literature tends to confirm the judgment of Congress that single-member districts do not create
division but have resulted in greater political and social responsiveness to minority interests and the inclusion
of minorities in decisionmaking. See RUFUS P. BROWNING ET AL. PROTEST ISNOT ENOUGI: Tile STRUGGLE
OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 141, 168 (1984); WILLIAM R. KEEIcH, Tile
IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING: THE ROLE OF THE VOTE IN THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 93-94 (1968). See also

Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1274-79
(1989); Milton D. Morris, Black Electoral Participationand the Distribution of Public Benefits, In TilE
RIGHT To VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION CONFERENCE (1981)

182. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1572 (citation omitted). The segregated schools available to blacks were so
grossly unequal that in 1963 the state took action to terminate state funds to Bleckley County. Hall v. Holder,
Tr. at 137. The local newspaper reported in 1963 that "the Negro schools . . . have been condemned for
several years." Id. PI.Ex. 244; Tr. at 249. Public housing was built on a racially segregated basis. Although no
longer segregated by law, Happy Hill Homes, built in the 1950s as a black project, has never had a white
resident. Id. Tr. at 68. Even the bookmobile in Bleckley County was Jim Crow. Id. PI.Ex. 56; Tr. at 408-09.
183. Holder II, 995 F.2d at 1572 (citation omitted). In 1960, representative Ben Jessup took out a
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c. "Local government had deprived blacks of the opportunity to participate in
public life and government, even' prohibiting blacks from registering to vote
18
and from voting until well into the 1960s." '
d. "[T]he black citizens of Bleckley County continue to suffer from the
effects of discrimination," and their "depressed socio-economic situation
'hinders the ability of and deters black residents of Bleckley County from
running for public office, voting and otherwise participating in the political
process.' "185
e. "[T]he 'personal preferences' of Bleckley County's citizens has resulted in
racially exclusive organizations," including churches, civic clubs, and social
clubs. 86 These organizations, which frequently serve as forums for political
candidates and political discourse, "give blacks and whites in Bleckley County
a different exposure to the candidates running for local, state, and national
offices. 187

political ad addressed "To the White Voters of Bleckley County" promising to vote for the continuation of
racial segregation. Hall v. Holder, PI.Ex. 20; Tr. at 408-09. Mr. Jessup is a member of the city council of
Cochran. The board of education adopted the position in 1965 that "racial integration of school students...
[was] morally and socially wrong." Id. PI.Ex. 260, Tr. at 249. After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Cochran closed its city pool and paved it over with bricks. Id. Tr. at 64. Schools in Bleckley County were not
desegregated until 1970, and only after the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare threatened to
terminate the county's federal funds. Id. PI.Ex. 274; Tr. at 144, 249.
184. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1572. Plaintiff Roberson first tried to register in Bleckley County in 1955
when he moved there to teach in the city schools. He went to the courthouse, the only place one could register.
but the chief of police escorted him outside. "No niggers register in this courthouse.," the chief informed him.
Hall v. Holder, Tr. at 55. Roberson complained about the incident to his school superintendent but the
superintendent told him, "just don't push the issue." Id. Tr. at 57. The following year someone burned a cross
in Roberson's yard. Id. Tr. at 73. Roberson did not try to register again until 1964. At the time the Voting
Rights Act was passed in 1965, only 45 blacks (3 T of the black voting age population) were registered to vote
in Bleckley County. US. CoMIIssioN ON CIVIL RIGHTS. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 232 (1968). Long after

passage of the Act some blacks were "afraid" to register at the courthouse. Hall v. Holder. Tr. at 338. Black
voter registration did not increase significantly until 1984 when satellite registration was first allowed. Id, Tr.
at 110, 279-80, 335-36. County officials did not appoint blacks as deputy registrars until 1984. and no blacks
were appointed as poll managers as late as 1986. Id. Tr. at 337, 277-78. Blacks filed a lawsuit in 1988
challenging continuing discrimination in the appointment of poll workers and managers in Bleckley County.
NAACP of Cochran/Bleckley County v. Bleckley County, No. 88-32-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. filed Feb. 10. 1988).
185. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1572 (citations omitted). Black voter turnout is lower than white voter
turnout. Hall v. Holder, Tr. at 321; PI.Ex. 390; Tr. at 321, 490.
186. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1573 and n.18. "Personal preferences" also perpetuate residential
segregation. In the early 1980s an African-American employee of the Georgia Power Company contracted to
buy a home in a white neighborhood in Cochran. Local whites opposed the sale and the African American
decided to live elsewhere. Hall v. Holder, Tr. at 69-70, 277.
187. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1573 & n.18. For example, in 1989 state senator Joseph Kennedy was
scheduled to speak at the Cochran Rotary Club in connection with his bid for lieutenant go'vernor. An aide
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f. There is only one polling place in Bleckley County-the Jaycee Barn in

Cochran owned by "an all-white civic club"-which serves as "a further
barrier to active political participation by blacks."' 8 a
g. The experiences of seasoned local black politicians showed that "as a
practical political matter, blacks are unable to sponsor candidates for Bleckley
County's sole commissioner office because such candidacies are futile." 189
h. White candidates regularly defeated black candidates in at-large elections
for the city of Cochran, the county seat and the largest municipality in the
county. 90 After the city adopted a new districting plan, black candidates won
in the majority-black district. 91
i. Plaintiff Hall was the only black to run for a countywide office, and he
lost.' 8 ' After litigation and the adoption of a single-member district plan for
the county board of education, he ran in the majority-black district and
won.

19

3

j. As late as the mid 1970s "a substantial number of Bleckley County's voters
were highly susceptible to racist, segregationist appeals . . . [and] voted
accordingly.' 94 They gave significant support to: J.B. Stoner, "an avowed
white racist," in the 1974 Lieutenant Governor election; Lester Maddox, a
former governor and segregationist, in the 1966 and 1974 Gubernatorial
elections; and then-segregationist George Wallace in the 1968 presidential
election. 8 5

Given the extraordinary record in Holder of discrimination and its
continuing effects, Justice Thomas's suggestion that single-member districts in

called defendant Holder prior to the engagement and asked him to "get as many blacks together" as possible
to help promote Kennedy's candidacy. Hall v. Holder, Tr. at 512. Instead of inviting blacks to the Rotary
Club, Holder arranged for the two blacks on the city council to meet separately with Kennedy at the public
library.
188. Holder I1, 955 F.2d at 1566, 1572-73 (citation omitted). According to plaintiff Roberson, "a lot of
people will not go there to vote because of [the racially exclusive membership policy of the Jaycees]." Hall v.
Holder, Tr. at 83.
189. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1571.
190. The only exception was Willie Basby who was first elected under the city's plurality vote system In
1973 in a contest with two whites, getting 39% of the vote. Thereafter, Basby ran as an incumbent, or having
been an incumbent. Both the district and appellate courts characterized Basby's success as "an aberration."
Holder 11, 955 F.2d at 1572 n.16; Hall v. Holder, Tr. at 808.
191. Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1572.
192. Id. at 1571 n.13.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1572.
195. Id.
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Bleckley County would cause or heighten racial tension is distinctly surreal.
As Justice Stevens wrote in Presley v. Etowah County Commission, "a few
pages of history are far more illuminating than volumes of logic and hours of
speculation about hypothetical line-drawing problems."'0 0 To say that
districting plans designed to remedy vote dilution in places like Bleckley
County would be the cause of racial politics is, in the words of the Senate
report, "like saying that it is the doctor's thermometer which causes high
fever."'1
Justice Thomas claims that the Court's vote dilution decisions are based on
assumptions that "should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal
of a color-blind Constitution."' 198 But those decisions are based on the
unexceptionable assumptions that at-large elections are not in themselves
illegal, 9 9 that minorities are not entitled to majority-minority districts unless
they can prove that an existing system dilutes their voting strength,2 00 and
that racial bloc voting and political cohesion cannot be assumed, but must be
201
proved in each case.
Another assumption that the vote dilution decisions of the Court make is
that it is in the best interest of the country "to banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting." 202 That assumption cannot fairly be characterized
as repugnant to the Constitution.
Justice Thomas relied heavily on the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas
in Wright v. Rockefeller 20 3 in arguing that all redistricting should be "colorblind."' 2° 4 But Justice Douglas's criticism in Wright was of electoral systems
in which seats were allocated exclusively on the basis of race and was in the
context of a congressional redistricting plan that "concentrate[d]" minorities
in one district and "exclude[d]" them from the rest.20 5 The problem presented

196.
197.
198.

Presley, 502 U.S. at 511.
S.RAEP. No. 417, supra note 23, at 34.
Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2598.

199. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 ("[E]lectoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be considred per
se violative of § 2.").
200. Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1156 ("[T]he federal courts may not order the creation of majorityminority districts unless necessary to remedy a violation of federal law.").
201. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he results test does not assume the existence of racial bloc voting;
plaintiffs must prove it."); Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1085.
202. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
203. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
204. Holder III, 114 S. Ct. at 2598.
205. Wright, 376 U.S. at 59.
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by the plan, as Justice Douglas defined it, was "kin to that in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot where racial gerrymandering was used to deprive Negroes of the
right to vote. ' '2 6 That Justice Douglas did not oppose the creation of singlemember districts to remedy minority vote dilution is apparent from his
subsequent dissenting opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis,2°0 in which he would
have required single-member districts for Marion County, Indiana to remedy
the dilution of minority voting strength caused by an existing multimember
districting plan. 20 8 In addition, Justice Douglas concurred in Regester,200
which, as noted supra, required single-member legislative districts in Texas.
Justice Douglas, as one of the architects of the results test, can best be viewed
as a proponent, not a foe, of redistricting designed to remedy minority vote
dilution.
Far from producing "segregation," the majority-minority districts are
generally the most integrated districts in a districting plan. The majorityblack district proposed by plaintiffs in Holder II is 65% black210 and is less
"segregated," i.e., composed of persons of the same race, than the existing
sole commissioner district, which is 77 % white.2 1' There are more whites
(35 % ) in the proposed majority-black district than there are blacks (22 %) in
212
the sole commissioner district.
There is also no basis for arguing that a plan of the sort proposed in Holder
III would destroy any need to build biracial coalitions, as Justice Thomas
suggests. 12 As far as the proposed majority black district is concerned, there
would be an even greater need for voters or candidates to build bridges
between racial groups and to form voting coalitions precisely because it is
more racially integrated and diverse than the county as a whole. Candidates
who failed to seek support across racial lines would stand the most likely
chances of being defeated. For this reason, the plan would promote biracial
politics, helping to break down, not reinforce, polarization.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. (citation omitted).
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id. at 180-81.
Register, 412 U.S. at 772.
Holder II, 955 F.2d at 1569 n.10.
Id. at 1565.
Id. at 1565, 1569 n.10.
Holder I11,
114 S. Ct. at 2599.
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V.

ADOPTION OF JUSTICE THOMAS'S ANALYSIS WOULD HAVE DlSASROUS
CONSEQUENCES FOR MINORITY OFFICE HOLDING

Adopting Justice Thomas's view that the Voting Rights Act does not reach vote
dilution would have devastating consequences for minority office holding. 14 The
increase in the number of minority elected officials in the South at all
levels-local, state, and national-is a product primarily of the increase in the
number of majority-minority districts, which in turn is a product of
implementation of the vote dilution standards of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act.
The most comprehensive and systematic study to date of the Voting Rights Act
is Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act 19651990,215 a collaborative effort by 27 political scientists, historians, and lawyers
funded by the National Science Foundation. It examined the impact of the Act in
eight southern states covered in whole or in part by the special preclearance
provisions of Section 5.218 The three principal conclusions of the study are:
First, the increase in the number of blacks elected to office in the South is a
product of the increase in the number of majority-black districts and not of
blacks winning in majority-white districts. Second, even today black
populations well above 50 percent appear necessary if blacks are to have a
realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in the South.
Third, the increase in the number of black districts in the South is primarily
the result not of redistricting changes based on population shifts as reflected
in the decennial census but, rather, of those required by the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and its 1982 amendments.... Federal intervention of this nature,
as well as voting rights suits brought by private litigants, was primarily

214. It is clear from Justice Thomas's concurring opinion that he believes the Act as a %ho!e. not just
Section 2, should be restricted to practices that limit access to the ballot. Id. at 2603 ("Districting systems and
electoral mechanisms that may affect the 'weight' given to a ballot duly cast and counted arc simply beyond
the purview of the Act."); id. at 2611 ("As is the case with § 2. § 5's description of the terms 'standard,
practice, or procedure' thus suggests a focus on rules that regulate the individual voter's ability to register and
cast a ballot, not a more abstract concern with the effect that various electoral systems might have on the
'weight' of the votes cast.").
215. (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.. 1994) [hereinafter QuiEr REvoLurroN].
216. The states are Alabama, Georgia. Louisiana. Mississippi. North Carolina, South Carolina. Texas.
and Virginia. Five counties in Florida are also covered by Section S. but that state was not included in the
study. No portions of Arkansas or Tennessee, the other two Confederate States. arc covered by Section 5. 28
C.F.R. pt. 51, App. (1994).
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21
responsible for the significant increase in southern black officeholding. 7

As an illustration of these findings, of the 17 African Americans elected to
Congress in 1992 from the 11 states of the old Confederacy, all were elected from
majority-minority districts."" For minorities to win, it has almost invariably been
necessary for them to run in districts with a majority or supermajority minority
population.
The only black in the twentieth century to win a seat in Congress from a
majority white district in one of the southern states targeted by the Voting Rights
Act was Andrew Young. He was elected in 1972 from the Fifth Congressional
District located in the Atlanta metropolitan area and in which blacks were over
40% of the population. 19 Still, voting was strongly racially polarized, and he only

217. QuIET REVOLUTION, supra note 215, at 335-36. These findings are generally consistent with those
of prior studies during the 1970s and 1980s comparing the success of black candidates in different election
systems. The great majority of the studies supported the common sense, and conventional, view that singlemember districts provided blacks greater electoral opportunities than at-large or multimember district
systems. See Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority-Group Representation:
A Re-Examination of Historicaland Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL. 982 (1981); Bernard Grofman, The
Effect of Ward vs. At-Large Elections on Minority Representation: Part II,A Review and Critique of
Twenty-Three Recent Empirical Studies in 1970-1980 (May 8, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the District of Columbia Law Review). Bullock and MacManus, by contrast, have argued that the proportion
of minority population is more important than the structure of elections. Charles S. Bullock, III & Susan A.
MacManus, Municipal Electoral Structure and the Election of Councilwomen, 53 J. POL. 75 (1991).
Thernstrom has made the remarkable, and unsupported, claim that racial bloc voting by whites against blacks
"isnow unusual," and that as a consequence majority-minority districts are generally unnecessary to remedy
vote dilution. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM. WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING

RIGHTS 243 (1987). The consensus among scholars, however, was summed up in a 1991 text to the effect that
"there is persuasive evidence that the electoral structure has a significant, perhaps even dominant, impact on
the extent of [minority officeholding]." M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 185 (1991). Even Bullock, in a more recent study of the relationship between districting format and
the election of African Americans to county commissions in Georgia, has come to the view that counties using
at-large elections "lag far behind in the rate at which they elect black commissioners," and that "blacks
elected in these counties [adopting district systems] won district rather than [at-large] seats." Charles S.
Bullock, III, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, DistrictingFormats,and the Election of African Americans,
56 J. POL. 1098, 1103-04 (1994).
218. See infra African-American Members and Racial Composition of Southern U.S. Congressional
Districts, 103rd Congress, First Session, Appendix A.
219.
QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 215, at 85. Harold Ford, an African American, was elected from
the majority white Ninth District in the Memphis, Tennessee area in 1974. As a result of demographic
changes and redistricting, the district now has a 54% black voting age population. See Infra Appendix A.
Barbara Jordan, another African American, was elected to Congress in 1972 from the Eighteenth District in
Texas, but the district was minority Anglo. It contained a black population of 42% and a Mexican-American
population of 19%. MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1974 at 1003 (1973).
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received 25% of the white vote. In 1990 Young ran for Governor of Georgia. In
both the primary and runoff he again received about one-fourth of the white vote,
but running statewide where blacks are 27 % of the population he was defeated.Y0
With the exception of the Ninth Congressional District in Tennessee, litigation,
the threat of litigation, or the Section 5 preclearance process applying principles of
vote dilution, caused the creation of the majority black congressional districts in
the South. Vote dilution litigation in the 1980s produced majority-black districts in
222
and Mississippi (the Second). 2a
Georgia (the Fifth), 21 Louisiana (the Second),
Vote dilution litigation in the 1990s produced a majority-black congressional
district in Alabama (the Seventh),2 24 two majority-black congressional districts in
Florida (the Third and the Seventeenth), and a third minority congressional
district (the Twenty-third) in which blacks and Hispanics combined were the
majority,225 and one in South Carolina (the Sixth). 226 During the 1990s Section 5
objections, or threatened objections, by the Attorney General also resulted in the
creation of two additional majority-black districts in Georgia (the Second and the
Eleventh), 221 one additional district in Louisiana (the Fourth), 228 and two in North
Carolina (the First and the Twelfth).2 29 The threat of litigation or objections to
preclearance by civil rights organizations was a factor in the creation of a second
majority-black district in Texas (the Thirtieth), 230 and one in Virginia (the
31
Third).

220.
221.
222.
223.
(1983), on
224.
225.

QUIEr REVOLUTION, supra note 215, at 85.

Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
Jordan v. Winter, 541 F. Supp. 1135 (N.D. Miss. 1982). vacated and remanded. 461 U.S. 921
remand, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1498-99 (S.D. Ala.). affd, 504 U.S. 902 (1992).
De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076. 1088 (N.D. Fla. 1992). offd In part. rev'd in part.

Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).

226. Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1367-69 (D.S.C. 1992). vacated and remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993).
227. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.). stay granted. 115 S. Ct. 36 (1994). prob. Jurs.
noted, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995).

228.

Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1196 n.21 (W.D. La. 1993). vacated and remanded, 114 S.

Ct. 2731 (1994), 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La.), prob. juris. noted. 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994).

229.

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2820-21 (1993).

230.

Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1315 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (noting the testimony of George

Korbel, director of litigation for Texas Rural Legal Aid and former regional director of the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense Fund, before a senate committee that unless an additional black congressional
district was created "the reapportionment of the Congress is not going to pass the Department of Justice-),
juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. (U.S. OCL 31, 1994).
231. NAACP and ACLU Oppose Redistricting Plan, THE VIRGINIAN-PILoT. Nov. 22. 1991. at D5; Bill
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Abolition of the standard of minority vote dilution, and the concomitant
abolition of majority-minority districts, would likely result in the elimination of
most, if not all, of the African-American members of Congress from the South.
The results in the rest of the country could be almost as dramatic. Of the 22 black
members elected outside the South, only 3 were elected from majority-white
congressional districts. 2 '
A pattern of minority office holding similar to that in Congress exists for
southern state legislatures. Approximately 90% of all southern black legislators in
the 1980s were elected from majority-black districts.2 8 These legislative districts
were generally created in response to Section 5 objections by the Attorney General
or Section 2 litigation. According to Quiet Revolution:
Action by the Justice Department, as well as by private litigants (particularly
in the 1980s, when civil rights and minority groups made use of the newly
amended provisions of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), accounts for most
of the growth in black legislative representation in the South. This action
usually took one of two forms: the state was required to change its election
system from multimember to single-member districts, at least in the areas of
the state with large concentrations of blacks; or, if the state already employed
single-member districts, the state was required to redraw its lines so as not to
fragment black voters.2 '
In Georgia, where Holder III arose, of the 40 black members serving in the
general assembly on January 1, 1994, only one was elected from a majority-white
district. Of the 31 black members of the Georgia house, 26 were elected from
Wasson, Wilder Plan Expected to Win Assembly OK, THE RICHMOND Naws LEADER, Dec. 3, 1991, at 1
(ACLU and NAACP prepared to challenge state plan if Governor "didn't increase black voting strength in
the 3rd District").
232. Elaine R. Jones, In Peril: Black Lawmakers, N.Y. TMimsS, Sept. 11, 1994, at E19. Majorityminority districts are under attack on another front as well. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2832, the Court
allowed a constitutional challenge to North Carolina's congressional redistricting which the plaintiffs alleged
was "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts." Shaw type challenges were subsequently filed against congressional redistricting in Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Texas. For a discussion of Shaw and its progeny, see the article in this volume: Frank R.
Parker, The Constitutionalityof Racial Redistricting: A Critiqueof Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REv. 1 (1995).
233. QuIET REVOLUTION, supra note 215, at 337.
234. Id. at 339-40. Section 5 objections resulted in the use of single-member legislative districts in
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Id. at 340. Litigation eliminated multimember districts
in Texas, White, 412 U.S. at 773, and in those portions of North Carolina not covered by Section 5. Glngles,
478 U.S. at 80.
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districts that were 60 % or more black. Of the nine black members of the
Georgia
235
senate, eight were elected from districts that were 60 % or more black.
The same pattern of Section 5 objections and vote dilution litigation that
produced an increased number of majority-minority districts, which in turn elected
minority officials, is repeated for southern cities and counties. As noted in Quiet
Revolution:
[We] reaffirm the standard view that at-large elections have deleterious
effects on black representation for cities with white majorities and a black
population of at least 10 percent. ... [D]ramatic gains in black representation

followed abolition of at-large elections-gains much greater than in cities that
remained at large. (The negative impact of at-large elections is felt in county
government too ... ).238
Again taking Georgia as an example, between 1974 and 1990 vote dilution
lawsuits were filed against 40 cities and 57 counties in the state challenging their
systems of at-large elections. 237 All but one of the cities, and 53 of the counties,
changed to district systems containing majority-black districts as a result of the
litigation. 238 The number of black elected officials in Georgia grew from 3 in 1964
to approximately 500 in 1990, the majority (88%) of whom were elected to city
and county offices.2 39 This increase can be "traced directly to the gradual demise
of at-large elections and the implementation of single-member districts containing
effective black voting majorities."24 0

235. See infra Georgia General Assembly, 1994, Majority-Minority Districts and African-American
Members, Appendix B. While only one black was elected from a majority-white district. house district 89.
whites won in 14 (25.9%) of the 54 majority-black districts. Given this level of white success, majority-black
districts cannot be dismissed simply as "quotas" or "'political ghettos for minorities." Voting Rights Act
Hearings,supra note 153, at 1115; S.REP. No. 417, supra note 23. at 103.
236. QuIET REvOLUTION, supra note 215, at 319.
237. Id. at 81.
238. Id. at 100 (the municipal exception was Macon, which successfully defended a Section 2 lawsuit
but later adopted district elections by legislation), and Tables 3.Z and 3.2-A (unpublished but on file with the
District of Columbia Law Review). The counties retaining their at-large systems arc Bleckley. Pulaski (sole
commissioner), Dodge, and Marion. Georgia County Government Yearbook 1995 (April 1995).
239. Id. at 89; JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND EcONOMItC STUDIES. NATIONAL Rosies OF BLACK
ELECTED OFFICIALS 10, 129 (1990).
240. QtnUET REVOLUTION, supra note 215, at 89-90. One civil rights advocate has criticized majorityminority districts for not accomplishing enough, i.e., for failing to achieve "the basic empowerment objectives
of voting reform," and has advocated alternative remedies, such as limited and cumulative voting which retain
at-large elections but reduce the number of votes necessary to win. Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and
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Abandoning the decades-old standard of minority vote dilution, with the
inevitable decline in the number of majority-minority districts, would likely return
Georgia, the South, and much of the rest of the nation to the days when legislative
bodies were largely, or exclusively, white. The majority of the Court in Holder v.
Hall properly rejected such a "radical" construction of the Voting Rights Act.

CONCLUSION

The country as a whole has a substantial interest in the racial diversity that
majority-minority districts have produced. As Justice O'Connor has written in a
related context, the exclusion of minorities from government not only "promotes
ignorance of minority problems . . . but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all
2 41
too often hostility toward the entire process of government.
While white elected officials can fairly represent racial minorities, our history
shows that frequently they have not and that some have been the architects of
virulent forms of racial discrimination. Racial diversity in legislative bodies
ensures that minorities will in fact be represented and that their views will be
heard. It insures that a variety of backgrounds and experiences are brought to
legislative decision making and problem solving. It promotes innovation and the
likelihood that the concerns of all Americans are identified.
Racial diversity and pluralism also help create trust and mutual respect. They
ensure the legitimacy of representative bodies by giving.them, and the electoral

Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go from Here, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: Tile VOTING
RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 283, 285 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (footnote
omitted). Limited and cumulative voting have been shown to be effective remedies for vote dilution,
particularly where a minority is politically cohesive but not sufficiently geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member districts. McDonald, supra note 181, at 1282-84; Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of GeographicCompactness in Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
173, 223-36 (1989). One court, however, has held that limited voting cannot be imposed as a remedy under
Section 2 over a defendant's objection. McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1988).
Another refused to approve a cumulative voting remedy on the ground that it would permit all the seats of a
governing body "to be filled by individuals living in the same general area," and would ignore a jurisdiction's
preference for representation of "the diverse interests of... various regions." Cane v. Worcester County, 35
F.3d 921, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1097 (1995). It is possible, of course, to articulate
principled objections to any system of elections, and it may well be that none can achieve a perfect distribution
of political power among all groups and interests. District systems, whatever their real or supposed
shortcomings, have provided minorities an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and that is a
compelling argument to continue their use.
241. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
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process as a whole, the appearance of fairness. In the words of James Madison,
diversity is proof that government is for all Americans, "[n]ot the rich more than
the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of
distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious
fortune... [but] the great body of the people of the United States."2' 2 And not,
we should add, one race more than another.

242. THE FEDERAuST No. 57. at 385 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.. 1961) quoted hith
approval in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1. 18 (1964).
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APPENDIX A
AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEMBERS AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SOUTHERN U.S.
243
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 103RD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

District
Alabama 7
Florida 3
Florida 17
Florida 23
Georgia 2
Georgia 5
Georgia 11
Louisiana 2
Louisiana 4
Mississippi 2
N. Carolina 1
N. Carolina 12
S. Carolina 6
Tennessee 9
Texas 18
Texas 30
Virginia 3
N = 17

Voting Age Population
Black
Hispanic
63.5
0.3
50.6
2.7
54.0
24.1
45.7
9.1
52.3
1.6
57.5
1.8
60.4
1.0
56.2
3.8
62.6
0.9
58.1
0.5
53.4
0.7
53.3
0.8
58.3
0.5
54.1
0.7
48.6
13.7
47.1
15.1
61.2
1.2

Total
63.8
53.3
78.1
54.8
53.9
59.3
61.4
60.0
63.5

58.6
54.1
54.1

58.8
54.8

62.3
62.3
62.4

Minority Member
Hilliard
Brown
Meek
Hastings
Bishop
Lewis
McKinney
Jefferson
Fields
Thompson
Clayton
Watt
Clyburn
Ford
Washington
Johnson
Scott

243. Source: 1990 U.S. Census, Population and Housing Profile, CongressionalDistricts of the 103rd
Congress, C.Q. WEEKLY REPORT, V. 51, 3473-87.
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APPENDIX B
GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1994, MAJORITY-MINORITY DiSTRIcTs
24
AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEMBERS 4

SENATE DISTRICT

2
10
11
12
15
22
26
35
36
38
39
43
55

Black Population
Voting Age
Total
61.3
57.7
64.2
67.9
58.9
54.0
62.4
57.7
56.8
53.3
60.9
56.9
55.2
60.2
71.0
66.4
64.0
70.3
79.7
77.2
66.6
61.6
65.1
60.9
64.2
60.6

Minority Member
Allen
Thomas
none
none

Harbison
Walker
Brown
Langford
Scott
Abernathy
none
Parish
none

HOUSE DISTRICT

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
68

80.7
84.2
79.7
91.2
78.4
89.2
75.0
72.5
63.3
81.0
61.1
91.6

74.5
81.5
76.9

88.9
75.6
86.6
71.8
67.9

59.2
76.1
57.0
89.4

Davis
Stanley, P.
Stanley, L.
McKinney
Canty
Holmes
Brooks
none
none
Sinkfield
Teague
McClinton

244. Source: Members of the Georgia General Assembly. Senate and House of Representatives. Second
Session of 1993-1994 Term (1994); Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008 (S.D. Ga.). Tr, Vol. IV at 237.
Stipulations Nos. 61-63; J. Ex. 11; Abrams Exs. 23-24.

100

69
70
71
72
73
89
93
111
116
117
118
121
124
127
131
133
134
136
140
141
148
149
151
158
159
161
162
173
178
179
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76.7
67.4
64.9
90.9
85.5
42.4
57.2
54.5
58.2
65.3
64.1
62.6
68.3
66.8
60.1
57.2
54.1
57.8
67.0
59.1
68.2
64.9
61.1
63.6
62.2
66.2
68.5
60.6
63.1
63.3

72.5
62.9
61.4
88.8
81.6
35.7
54.2
50.1
54.1
61.2
60.6
58.8
62.5
62.4
55.8
54.3
50.1
54.0
64.4
54.1
63.2
60.0
56.3
58.8
57.4
60.7
64.9
57.3
58.0
59.1

Mobley
Baker
Jones
Randolph
Turnquest
Heard
none
none
Hart
Brown
Howard
none
Lucas
Randall
Epps
Hugley
Taylor
Smyre
James
none
Johnson
Pelote
none
none
none
White
Roberts
Tillman
none
none

